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“What works in one period is unlikely to work in the next… So when 
deciding which tiger to ride, it is worth remembering that the choice is only 
between tigers, and that if a safe ride is what you want, you would do well 
not to ride tigers at all”  (COATES, 2007:193). 
  
With ongoing EU expansion, much attention has focused on the impact of the so-
called new member states (NMSs) on economic performance and adjustment within 
the EU.  At the policy level, since the Lisbon ‘Growth and Jobs’ agenda emphasis 
has been placed on the role of foreign direct investment (FDI) attraction, as 
promoted through a combination of flexible labour and product markets and low 
corporate taxes (MABBETT and SCHELKE, 2007). 
Up to the recent credit crunch, CEE economic performance had been relatively 
impressive, with GDP per capita for the NMSs (adjusted for purchasing power 
standards, or PPS) demonstrating gradual convergence to the EU average across 
CEE states (EUROSTAT, 2008b). This convergence, however, showed significant 
variation, with the Czech Republic and Slovenia having a higher GDP per capita in 
PPS terms than Portugal by 2007 (IBID.). This is illustrated in Table 1 below, which 
details the change in GDP per capita in PPS (with the EU 28 average as a 
benchmark of 100) between 2002 and 2007, just before the global financial crisis 
(GFC). In addition, by August 2008, unemployment rates in most of the CEE 
countries were below the EU-27 average of 6.9%, with Slovenia at 4.2% and the 
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Czech Republic at 4.3% appearing particularly impressive (EUROSTAT, 2008a). 
This would suggest, prima facie, that the dominant development approach of FDI-led 
growth was initially successful for CEE states in regeneration and re-orientating their 
economies.  
INSERT TABLE 1 
However, more recent evidence paints a far more pessimistic appraisal, with all the 
economies concerned displaying the effects of the recent recession in terms of 
higher unemployment, casting doubt on the FDI-led growth model. Yet it remains 
notable that of the ten CEE 2004 accession states, unemployment in six was below 
the EU-28 average of 8.6% in July 2016 (EUROSTAT, 2016).iii This in turn calls for a 
more nuanced appraisal of FDI as part of a successful industry policy and of different 
performance of regions and economies. 
In this context, before the onset of the GFC, Ireland had been ‘put up in lights’ as a 
possible model for small CEE states (ACS et al., 2007) in some regards at least. 
Experiencing growth rates of over 8% per year in the latter part of the 1990s, 
Ireland’s  income per capita went from around  two-thirds that in the UK in 1990 to 
parity (and with the then EU average) by 2000. Sustained expansion through the 
2000s saw Ireland with the third-lowest unemployment rate in the EU-27 by May 
2007: at approximately 4.1% (EUROSTAT, 2007b). The transformation from the 
‘poorest of the rich’ to ‘Europe’s shining light’ (THE ECONOMIST, 1988; 1997) was 
heralded all over the world. 
                                                 
iii
 Namely: Czech Republic (4.1%), Estonia (6.8%), Hungary (5.1%), Malta (4.9%), Poland (6.2%), 
Romania (6%) and Slovenia (8%). 
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Post 2007, however, this ‘Celtic Tiger’ narrative changed dramatically. The Irish 
economy went into decline in late 2008, with unemployment increasing before the 
impacts of the GFC were experienced (EUROSTAT, 2008a). Indeed, by early 2010, 
the unemployment rate in Ireland had increased to 13.2% (EUROSTAT, 2010a) by 
the Autumn of 2013, unemployment had reached 13.6% (EUROSTAT, 2013). 
In light of the significance of this Irish economic downturn (Irish real GDP contracted 
by 4.8 per cent per annum between 2008 and 2011 (ESRI, 2013: 1), it is pertinent to 
reflect on the perceived successes and failures of industrial policy in Ireland, 
dominated as it has been by FDI-attraction as its centre piece. Much mainstream 
analysis has concerned itself with a narrow set of ‘conventional’ policies which have 
been seen as successful for a while at least. Typical of such commentary was the 
EU’s Sapir Report and associated updates (SAPIR et al., 2003; SAPIR GROUP, 
2005; and SAPIR, 2006). These have emphasised the positive role for FDI and the 
elements that made up a favourable environment for investors such as  
administrative capacity, a supportive macro environment and flexible labour markets, 
(BAILEY et al., 2007). This paper pushes the analysis a step further in analysing 
Ireland, and a small CEE state that was as an exemplar of the Irish FDI-led approach 
(The ‘Pannonian Tiger’; FINK, 2006); Hungary - and asks: can Ireland and Hungary 
really provide ‘lessons’ for small CEE states?  
The approach employed in the current paper is an alternative one to that provided by 
ACS et al. (2007) which considered whether the so-called ‘Irish miracle’ might be 
replicated in the small open state of Hungary. Here, however, we position Ireland 
and Hungary in a similar category (for reasons subsequently discussed) and ask 
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whether together they can provide industrial policy lessons for other small CEE 
economies?  In so doing, the paper suggests that both Ireland and Hungary have 
provided examples for small CEE countries in some regards but not in others.iv 
Specifically, Ireland can offer ‘lessons’ vis-à-vis building administrative capacity, the 
positioning and attempting to embed FDI, and promoting domestic entrepreneurship, 
although as argued  in subsequent sections the latter came much too late. 
Similarly, Hungary had pursued an FDI-led approach to development which for too 
long neglected developing domestic capacity or seeking to embed transnational 
corporations (TNCs) in local webs. Rather, as will be seen, the Hungarian 
experience was typified by TNCs producing solely to use the host nation as an 
export platform, and this relatively favourable position started to be questioned once 
EU entry in 2004 put paid to the generous subsidies and other assistance measures 
that had operated until then (FINK, 2006; DÖRRENBÄCHER, 2007).  With the onset 
of the GFC, the Hungarian economy was one of the worst affected, with a US$15.7 
billion International Monetary Fund (IMF) bailout in November 2008 necessitating 
severe austerity measures including cuts in government spending (STEIN, 2010). 
The discussion that follows argues that there are severe problems in adopting the 
‘Irish approach’ and that of its Hungarian counterpart, especially as they risk 
entrenching patterns of uneven development (HYMER, 1975).  In particular, the 
industrial policy lessons that Ireland and Hungary can provide for other small CEE 
states are examined, given that industrial policy is indeed ‘back on the agenda’ of 
                                                 
iv
 An issue for both Ireland and Hungary is that they do not constitute major markets. This is likely to 
influence the degree of embedding by incoming TNCs. This limits comparisons across all the CEE 
states. 
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late (BAILEY et al, 2015). Here, the argument is that there is no ‘golden bullet’ (e.g. 
FDI) for economic development.  Rather, small CEE states need to adopt a broader 
industrial policy development approach and perspective than that which is normally 
discussed in the context of Ireland and Hungary. To this we turn next.  
 
DEFINING INDUSTRIAL POLICY 
Whilst now regarded as ‘back on the agenda’ at state and EU levels (BAILEY et al., 
2015; BAILEY and LENIHAN, 2015), the theoretical rationale for industrial policy (IP) 
has traditionally been studied from a ‘market failure’ perspective. More recently, 
however, this mainstream ‘conventional’ take on IP has progressed to become 
increasingly concerned with creating appropriate ‘enabling framework conditions’ for 
firms and sectors to start up, develop and innovate.  A prime concern has been the 
enabling of successful economic adjustment in countries and regions as industries 
transform, within the context of capital mobility. According to this view, firms are then 
seen as regularly interacting with a number of different organisations; other firms, 
universities, research centres, financial institutions, funding agencies, government 
agencies and so on.  According to this framework, ‘systems of innovation’, clusters 
and networks are regarded as key frameworks. AIGINGER (2007) summarises this 
‘systemic industrial policy’ approach as one that supports training, education, and 
entrepreneurship, encourages FDI and exports in so-called catch-up economies and 
dovetails with policies on innovation, clusters and ‘dynamic competitiveness’ in the 
higher income countries.  In a similar vein to Aiginger, this paper suggests that often 
used concepts relating to industrial policy are too narrow and simplistic. ‘Good 
 7 
practice’ industrial policy is in fact significantly more ‘holistic’ and wide-ranging in its 
orientation, and needs to consider a range of supply and demand-side elements in 
industrial development (BAILEY et al., 2009).   
Looking at the Irish context, for example, the CULLITON (1992) report highlighted 
the requirement for an industrial policy which adopted a holistic approach 
comprising: a re-focusing of the education and training system; increased funding for 
science and technology (with greater business involvement in steering the use of 
such support); more focus on technology acquisition; the provision of infrastructural 
needs; and reform of the tax system.  In addition, the need to foster clusters of 
related industries building on ‘leverage points’ for national advantage was also 
emphasised.  With regards to indigenous industry, the Culliton Report suggested that 
a widespread existence of grants was counterproductive (BAILEY et al., 2009).  The 
report also strongly emphasised the need to expand indigenous industries.  Related 
to this issue, Culliton suggested that two grant-awarding agencies be set up, with 
one addressing the needs of incoming multinationals, and the other focused on 
indigenous firms’ needs.    
Such a ‘holistic’ approach to industrial policy is a helpful first stage, however, we 
argue that any ‘good practice’ or ‘holistic’ definition of industrial policy should also 
incorporate micro, meso and macro perspectives requiring: well-functioning labour 
markets (so that available labour supply can be matched to demand); a supportive 
regulatory environment; and supportive macroeconomic conditions (as regards 
exchange rate and fiscal policy for example). Moreover, industrial policy should at 
the outset build in policy evaluation processes right along the evaluation spectrum 
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going from ex-ante to ex-post.  In particular, identifying mechanisms that work - and 
under which circumstances - before any intervention occurs is seen as critical.  
As outlined previously, the rationale for industrial policy interventions should not 
solely be underpinned by a narrow and reactive market failure perspective (as a 
rationale for government intervention) but also need to encompass ‘systemic’ 
reasons for intervention (e.g. with regards to innovation policy, account needs to be 
taken of the fact that organisations are not innovating in isolation but in the context of 
a system). This approach also has to account for ‘government failure’ or 
‘bureaucratic failure’ which has been down-played by some researchers when 
considering the advantages and disadvantages of industrial policy interventions.  As 
KREUGER (1990) notes, when faced with market and systemic failures, it is 
imperative to understand how government itself  operates, if the state is to accurately 
assess whether intervention is likely to remedy such failures (AIGINGER, 2007).  
Finally, developing a genuinely holistic industrial policy requires the recognition of 
the phenomenon of uneven development (HYMER, 1975) noted above; notably “the 
tendency of the system to produce poverty as well as wealth, underdevelopment as 
well as development” (in COWLING and SUGDEN, 1999; 364). In this regard, over-
emphasis on attracting FDI from footloose multinational firms may serve simply to 
reinforce uneven patterns of development such that major cities (such as Dublin or 
Budapest) attract high-level activities and investment, whilst peripheral regions and 
(typically regional/rural) and smaller cities/towns attract lower-level ‘routine’ 
assembly activities – hence contributing to  patterns of inequality. Take Ireland’s 
capital city (Dublin) for example; as argued by BARRY (2008), the majority of firms in 
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the high-tech industries (dominated by TNCs) of computer hardware and software 
are clustered around the Dublin area.  In a similar vein, by 2005, the numbers 
employed in the International Financial Services Centre (IFSC) (also located in 
Dublin) was 20,000 (ie. 40% of total employment of financial services in Ireland) 
(BIELENBERG and RYAN, 2013: 114). The implication for policy therefore is that 
attention needs to be paid to peripheral regions  and ‘second tier’ cities,  in terms of 
improving local/regional capabilities and in terms of transport and infrastructure 
support, so as to increase relative competitive advantages as part of a more ‘place 
based’ approach to industrial and regional policy. In this regard, one can refer to a 
holistic industrial policy as addressing uneven development through promoting real 
capability endowment in local communities, thus addressing ‘strategic failure’ 
(BAILEY and DE RUYTER, 2007). 
INDUSTRIAL POLICY IN IRELAND (THE CASE OF THE ‘CELTIC TIGER’) 
Specifically, Ireland has been cited as something of a ‘role model’ for small CEE 
states vis-à-vis its ability to attract and use FDI, especially from the United States. 
Relative to the size of its economy, by 2008 Ireland had one of the highest levels of 
FDI inflows in the ‘developed’ world. Beginning in the 1950s, Irish governments over 
many years engaged in a strategy of ‘industrialisation by invitation’ (BEGLEY et al., 
2005).v  Ireland has been oft noted as a ‘first mover’ in the attraction of FDI (GAL, 
2013).  Moreover, FDI promotion policies have been pursued by successive Irish 
                                                 
v
 The development agency IDA Ireland was formed in 1949 and was initially tasked with stimulating, 
supporting and developing export-led business and enterprise in Ireland. This covered both 
indigenous and foreign investment and start-up enterprises. In 1969 the IDA was incorporated as an 
autonomous state-sponsored body under the Industrial Development Act and given responsible for all 
aspects of industrial development. In 1994 the IDA was broken up into three separate organisations, 
with the IDA focusing on the promotion and development of foreign direct investment (FDI) in Ireland. 
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governments (TEAGUE, 2009).  One of the key enticements offered over the 1950s 
and 1960s was a zero percent tax rate on exports (IBID).  Subsequently, from the 
early 1970s, policy shifted towards a more selective and targeted approach. 
Pharmaceutical and electronics were targeted in particular, being seen as offering 
promising opportunities.  This was despite the fact that the sorts of activities that IT 
industries tended to engage in at this point in time were mainly low-value assembly 
type operations (BEGLEY et al., 2005).   
Furthermore, the United States was targeted as the market for such projects given 
the likely benefits that would accrue to US firms by using Ireland as an export base 
within the EU. It is important to note that the promotion and assistance of particular 
sectors was well timed. For example, the extension by the Irish government of 
financial incentives to internationally traded services just as they were about to grow 
in importance was a particularly timely intervention. If strategic targeting and a more 
focused approach to FDI was a key part of the ‘success’ of FDI, this raises the 
question as to what sectors should small CEE economies now be targeting? 
Over many decades, the Irish government has also enticed much FDI via a low 
corporation tax regime.  Specifically, in the early days, there was a 10 per cent 
corporation tax on the profits of manufacturing companies, rising subsequently to 
12.5 per cent and extended to all sectors (BUCKLEY and RUANE, 2006).  This 
relatively low corporation tax has understandably come under much criticism by 
governments of other countries in recent years.  In a related vein, the oft commented 
upon significant productivity differentials between foreign and indigenous firms in 
Ireland has largely been attributed to the transfer pricing  practices of FDI so as to 
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benefit from Ireland’s low corporation tax (ARORA and GAMBARDELLA, 2005).   
Nevertheless, the targeting, promotion and support for particular sectors by Irish 
industrial policy from the 1970s onwards was in fact well timed. In addition, it is also 
acknowledged that the development agency (Industrial Development Authority) 
played a pivotal role in encouraging, welcoming and providing an after-care service 
for incoming firms (O’RIAIN, 2004).  Indeed, we would concur with the analysis of 
KILLEEN (1975) when he argues that Ireland needed FDI for economic development 
and that a reliance on solely indigenous firms would not have been sufficient to 
deliver sustainable economic growth. However, our argument in this paper is that 
over-reliance on FDI (without a simultaneous and linked focus on indigenous firms) 
also stopped short in terms of being able to deliver on sustainable economic growth. 
Rather, we argue that a more holistic/sustainable approach to economic 
development and policy is required, which has a form of ‘ownership mix’ (foreign and 
indigenous firms) at its core and hence does not ‘put all the eggs into the one 
industrial policy basket’. 
Rather, at this time, in Irish policy making, there was simply an assumption was that 
FDI infusion would result in “aggregate technological progress” due to spillover 
effects generated by the presence of transnational corporations (TNCs) in a host 
economy (FINK, 2006: 49).  It could reasonably be argued that Ireland appeared to 
have performed well in this regard – although this is a questionable proposition to 
which we now turn. Indeed questions to ask here are: (i) did a strategy of pursuing 
FDI led growth result in a neglect of the indigenous sector (largely SMEs) in Ireland? 
(ii) What does the evidence suggest regarding the existence of linkages and 
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spillovers in Ireland (given the focus on an FDI led growth strategy?).  The section 
concludes by considering the related issue of the development (or not) of industrial 
clusters in Ireland.   
BAILEY et al. (2007) argued that the Irish government, on acknowledging the 
limitations of solely focusing on FDI as a driver of growth, also tried to develop 
indigenous SMEs and entrepreneurship. Whilst acknowledging this shift, we argue 
that a policy focus on indigenous SMEs should have been prioritised at an earlier 
stage of economic development.  Remarkably, even though “as far back as 1979, 
some 95 per cent of all manufacturing units could be classified as SMEs” 
(ANDREOSSO-O’CALLAGHAN and LENIHAN, 2006: 282), there was no formal 
policy concern by the Irish government on the SME sector until 1994, culminating in 
the publication of the ‘Task Force on Small Business Report’ (1994).  
Indeed, we would go so far as to argue that, Irish policymakers largely neglected the 
indigenous (largely SME) sector until the mid-1990s. This is evident in statements by 
numerous reviews of industrial policy over many years (TELESIS CONSULTANCY 
GROUP:1982), which emphasised Ireland’s over-emphasis on foreign industry as 
well as the CULLITON Report (1992). Yet it was not until the 1994 ‘Task Force on 
Small Business Report’ that SME policy was at last prioritised.   
Rather, as noted, there had been the hope that indigenous SMEs would ‘grow from 
foreign firms through linkages and spillovers’ (ANDREOSSO-O’CALLAGHAN and 
LENIHAN (2006: 280).  Even when SME policy moved centre-stage, how successful 
were policy interventions in promoting linkages and spillovers between TNCs and 
indigenous (largely SME) firms? Despite the prevailing narrative highlighting FDI-led 
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adjustment, there is significant evidence to suggest few significant relationships 
between the foreign (FDI) and domestic sectors (UGUR and RUANE, 2004). 
It is fair to say that, however, that there was evidence in some sectors at least of 
improved linkages over time (on electronics for example see GÖRG and RUANE, 
2001), even if foreign firms had fewer linkages (possibly due to the necessary scale 
needed to supply such firms (ibid.)). In high-technology sectors, the evidence of 
spillover effects was more obvious (GÖRG and STROBL, 2003; BARRY and VAN 
EGERAAT, 2008a). Here, there was evidence to support the view that the presence 
of TNCs did have a “life-enhancing” effect on indigenous plants, improved 
indigenous entry rates, and ameliorated links between manufacturers and 
components suppliers in sectors such as information technology. 
Other studies (e.g., HEANUE and JACOBSON, 2003; FORFÁS, 2004) have 
examined the linkages issue. The National Linkages Programme was introduced in 
1985 and shifted policy towards the building of supply networks and chains, as 
opposed to direct local company linkages, with mixed success. On this, FORFÁS 
(2004) outlined that the National Linkages Programme stopped somewhat short of 
reaching its potential, while HEANUE and JACOBSON (2003) argued that there was 
a degree of success up to the 1990s but thereafter its impact was rather insignificant. 
The overall conclusion on the success or otherwise of linkages and linkages policy in 
Ireland was summed up by RUANE (2001:12):  “it is hard to either totally prove or 
disprove” whether linkage policies were successful. 
One sector in particular has been held up as having been of central importance in 
the Irish FDI-led development story, notably the IT sector, where software firms have 
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been frequently highlighted by commentators as some of the most iconic examples 
of FDI spillovers (BEGLEY et al, 2005; ANDREOSSO-O’CALLAGHAN et al, 2014). 
On these, BUCKLEY et al. (2006) argued that various factors contributed to 
enhancing productivity spillovers to the indigenous software industry in Ireland, 
including the following: (1) SMEs choosing to locate in Ireland could be described as 
technologically superior TNCs; (2) the TNC software sector in Ireland was over-
ridingly export focused; (3) former employees of TNCs  who subsequently proceeded 
to establish their own ventures were key agents of knowledge transfer to local 
software firms; (4) indigenous software firms had a high absorptive capacity: (5) a 
clustering of indigenous and TNC firms; and (6) that the indigenous software sector 
was enhanced by Irish government policy. The latter which concerned itself with a 
reorientation of the education system from the 1980s worked to provide a strong 
supply of graduates for technology focused industries such as the IT sector 
(ANDREOSSO-O’CALLAGHAN et al., 2014).  The number of indigenous software 
firms increased from 290 firms in 1991 to approximately 770 by 2000.  As a result, 
employment grew from 3,800 in 1991 to 14,000 jobs by 2000 (DEPARTMENT OF 
JOBS, ENTERPRISE AND INNOVATION, 2003).  
Yet this focus and success in attracting high-quality FDI in the IT sector still resulted 
in a vulnerability to strategic decision making by TNCs headquartered outside of 
Ireland. This was clearly illustrated through the case of the Canadian software firm 
Corel. This was viewed as star ‘success story’ of plant upgrading in the 1990s but 
was shut down in 2000 when a corporate desire for closure out-weighed the benefits 
arising from the strong local links built up by the firm (WHITE, 2004).  There tends to 
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be, as argued by GÖRG and STROBL (2003), an unwillingness by foreign-owned 
multinational companies to continue to operate unprofitable operations in host 
economies, with them relocating to more competitively priced locations.   
Turning to consider the issue of wider clustering effects, it should be noted that key 
to maximising FDI spillovers and linkages is the development of successful industrial 
clusters. Here, significant efforts to build sectoral and spatial clusters in Ireland truly 
began in earnest only in the 1980s (BUCKLEY and RUANE, 2006). Such efforts 
were then targeted at certain key ‘high technology’ sectors, notably electronics, 
medical devices and chemicals/pharmaceuticals.  In a similar vein, particularly for IT, 
some of the key brand names in these sectors (such as Intel and Microsoft) were 
attracted to establish operations in Ireland. With the attraction of such ‘performance’ 
firms, and later Hewlett Packard in printing, Ireland effectively had an “electronics 
hub” with the “spokes” subsequently populated by dozens of smaller enterprises 
(IBID).  Thus, while Ireland could be regarded as having been a major beneficiary of 
cluster formation, evidence regarding the real impact of clusters in Ireland is scarce 
and largely inconclusive. In so far as evidence exists, it suggests that there has been 
relatively minor success in sectoral clustering between TNCs and local firms, 
particularly in low-tech sectors and manufacturing (BUCKLEY and RUANE, 2006). 
It was later recognised, however, that as more low-value-added activities were 
shifted by footloose TNCs to lower-cost economies, an increased proportion of GNP 
would have to be generated by indigenous firms (see the Report of the SMALL 
BUSINESS FORUM, 2006;  GOVERNMENT OF IRELAND, 2008). Whilst welcoming 
this new focus, this recognition of the role of the indigenous sector should have 
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arisen much earlier, and can offer a significant ‘lesson’ for small CEE states. This 
point reiterates the need for a holistic industrial policy that welcomes FDI but also 
demonstrates an awareness of the limitations and fragilities of FDI-led growth, and 
hence promotes measures to grow domestic capacities and entrepreneurship. 
Moreover, it is notable that the stock of FDI in Ireland declined over the period 2002 
– 2005  as did the US share (on which Ireland was overly dependent), which peaked 
at some 31,000 million euros, or over 20% of FDI stocks in 2001 (CSO, 2004; 2005; 
2008). Ireland has also suffered from the loss of TNCs leaving Ireland in recent 
years, with firms moving in search of lower labour costs for example (COLLINS and 
GRIMES, 2008).   Writing in the IRISH TIMES newspaper in late 2009, LENIHAN 
and BAILEY (commenting on Dell shifting its manufacturing plant from Limerick in 
Ireland to Lodz, Poland) highlighted the lack of resilience in a local economic 
development strategy that had relied so heavily on one large TNC to act as a 
significant employment generator in the fourth largest Irish city. The Dell pull-out led 
to the loss of 2,000 jobs directly in Limerick, with wider multiplier effects (some 2,600 
jobs lost in the wider economy for example in Dell suppliers).  The key issue here 
was that Dell suppliers had failed to significantly diversify beyond Dell and so were 
particularly vulnerable to retrenchment.  This was not atypical of a series of 
redundancies amongst multinational affiliates in Ireland over 2009-2011 (firms such 
as Boston Scientific, Amann, Georgia-Pacific, Teva, Element Six and others).  
Nevertheless, by 2011 FDI in Ireland began to rise again, with almost 150 
investments in 2011, a 17% rise on 2010 (IDA, 2011).  Indeed, it should be stressed 
that the TNC sector has played an active role in Ireland’s recovery. While the sector 
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shed jobs, it also was the source of the vast majority of jobs created in Ireland from 
2010 – 2012 (ERM, 2013).  In addition, as COLLINS and GRIMES (2011) note, the 
types of jobs gained were of a higher value than those lost, representative of a move 
up the value chain for many high technology subsidiaries in Ireland.  
Overall, whilst Ireland has remained a high recipient of FDI in relative terms, and FDI 
actually helped the Irish recovery gather pace, the recent decline in FDI stocks 
should send a clear warning to those who would simply point to the virtues of FDI-led 
growth. Rather, the Irish case (and the case of Hungary, which is examined next) 
demonstrates that what can be given, can be taken away, and that the economy is 
vulnerable to both external ‘shocks’ and decision-making at corporate headquarters 
elsewhere, and that an over-reliance on FDI brings with the dangers of uneven 
development. FDI may be needed for many reasons for economic development such 
as increasing capital accumulation, raising productivity and export performance 
through mutually reinforcing tendencies (see EBRD, 1998) and generating 
technological and organisational benefits for domestic suppliers and competitors.   
It should be acknowledged that in the wake of the GFC, Irish government policy 
makers placed a significant emphasis on SMEs, entrepreneurship and indigenous 
firms as potentially significant contributors to job creation and economic growth more 
generally (DEPARTMENT OF ENTERPRISE, TRADE AND INNOVATION, 2010; 
2012 and 2013).  However, as we argue throughout this paper, such a policy focus 
(in the spirit of a more holistic industrial policy) should have come much earlier. 
Additionally, it is also somewhat worrying that it may have taken a crisis to spur on 
the Irish government to take SMEs, indigenous capacity and entrepreneurship 
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seriously vis-à-vis its policy agenda.  Indeed, developing a competitive indigenous 
SME sector with links to TNCs and diversifying the nature of the economy over time 
should be a focal ‘ lesson’ for industrial policy as the economy develops in small 
open economies. 
INDUSTRIAL POLICY IN HUNGARY (THE CASE OF THE ‘PANNONIAN TIGER’) 
Hungary had also been widely cited by bodies such as the OECD and the World 
Bank as an example of highly successful transition to a market economy for other 
developing economies to follow (FINK, 2006: 47) – prompting comparisons with 
Ireland of a so-called ‘Pannonian Tiger’ (IBID: 48). However, the process of 
adjustment and transition involved in FDI attraction has entailed significant problems, 
rendering evocations of a ‘Tiger’ highly questionable (IBID).  As noted earlier, the 
Hungarian economy suffered reversals and has stagnated even before the GFC, 
with unemployment having risen from 5.8% in 2002 to 7.7% as at May 2007 
(EUROSTAT, 2007a), and post GFC reaching 10.1% in August 2013 (EUROSTAT, 
2013). 
Under the old socialist regime (as with other CEE countries), full employment, social 
equality and balanced regional development were major, explicit policy objectives 
(FAZEKAS, 2005). However, this did not preclude Hungary from participating in the 
world economy; with Hungary joining the GATT in 1973 and the Bretton Woods 
institutions in 1982; enabling access to World Bank loans, for example (FINK, 2006). 
The inadvertent result of this, however, was an ultimately unsustainable level of 
foreign debt (with a near-default in 1990), which in turn became a key driver for the 
rapid opening up and privatisation of the economy that ensued (IBID.). Indeed, a key 
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economic constraint that the country has faced since the late 1980s (notably its large 
foreign debt and current account and fiscal deficits) effectively fuelled the 
government’s desire to attract FDI as part of the large scale privatisation process, in 
an attempt to raise revenue and hard currency.   
Indeed a major criticism of the 1990s’ privatisation programme in Hungary was that it 
largely neglected domestic investors in an explicit attempt to raise as much revenue 
as possible from asset sales.vi The wooing of foreign investors continued apace with 
FDI inflows peaking during the mid-1990s in association with the large utility 
privatizations (BAILEY, 1995). The imbalances and tensions this produced were 
evident, for example, in the case of the vegetable oil industry, which was sold off to a 
foreign buyer as a single entity, with a state owned monopoly simply becoming a 
private, foreign monopoly. Such a situation was not untypical, with the privatisation 
programme seen by many as little more than a state-sponsored programme of 
mergers and acquisitions (BAILEY, 1995), where the state lacked the skills, 
information or incentives needed to split up many enterprises and instead found it 
easier to sell them off complete with substantial market shares (EBRD, 1994), which 
meant that it could raise more revenue in the process.  
As such, between 1989 and 1999, Hungary received approximately 30% of FDI 
inflows into the CEE region, reflecting FDI-friendly policies pursued by governments 
at the time, irrespective of their political persuasion (FINK, 2006: 53). In so doing, it 
used a range of programmes and incentives. These included Export Processing 
                                                 
vi
 The comparison between Ireland and Hungary is, we feel, worthwhile, but the cases are somewhat 
different in that much Hungarian FDI was through acquisition. Although often heralded by policy 
makers, this may not add either plant or employment and may have different long term impacts as 
compared to greenfield investment. 
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Zones (EPZs), which were special tax and duty-free areas – largely granting 
exemption from certain taxes and excises. Accordingly, the EPZ share of exports 
increased from 18% in 1996 to over 43% in 1999 (IBID: 59). Other measures 
included accelerated amortisation, fully convertible national currency and direct 
financial support for plant, job creation and training (ACS et al., 2007: 133). 
Approximately 50% of FDI as at 2004 had come from geographically proximate 
neighbours; Germany (most notably with the Audi automotive company) and Austria 
(IBID.). In this context, the uneven development inherent with the shift to capitalist 
production should be noted, in that Budapest was the main beneficiary from FDI, 
whilst other localities depended on their proximity (or relative access) to Western 
European markets (VARRO, 2010), with the net result being to widen disparities 
between Budapest and the rest of the country (IBID.). Similarly, HUNYA (2014) 
notes that “FDI has reinforced and did not mitigate regional disparities in Hungary”. 
The dominance of TNCs in the Hungarian economy was reflected in the fact that by 
2000, over 90% of Hungarian exports were by TNCs - and over 80% of imports 
(FINK, 2006). Similarly to Ireland, however, the vast productivity differences between 
the TNC and domestic sectors raised suspicions of TNCs having engaged in transfer 
pricing (IBID; 61), with questions over whether appropriated surplus value was going 
in an East-West direction (SOKOL, 2001). In a similar vein, BUCKLEY et al. (2006) 
argued that the significance of the contribution of TNCs to the Irish economy could 
have been overestimated by failing to account for the following: high level of imports; 
(including payments for patents, royalties and other intangible inputs); and 
repatriated profits.   
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Moreover, and quite similar to the case of Ireland noted earlier, there was little 
evidence to suggest that the presence of TNCs generated significant spillover effects 
to the domestic sector (ACS et al., 2007), with productivity in the manufacturing FDI 
sector exceeding that of domestic firms by over 215% in 2001 (FINK, 2006: 61) and 
at best a patchy record on local linkages (DÖRRENBÄCHER, 2007). FINK (2006) 
argued that FDI in Hungary could be seen as a result of the search for increasing 
returns to scale by transnational firms (rather than ‘comparative advantage’ per se) 
and as such, it should not be surprising that intra-industry trade comprised the 
dominant component of FDI in Hungary. This was given the fact that TNCs could 
afford to pay higher wages than smaller-scale, lower-technology domestic firms in 
turn contributed to rising insolvency rates in domestic firms and a consequent 
relocation of domestic production to lower-wage neighbouring CEE countries. This 
was exacerbated by the problems faced by some domestic firms in accessing 
finance. PLANK and STARITZ (2013) argue that the barriers to spillovers were 
indeed significant in the Hungarian case – citing evidence from the electronics 
sector, they point out that FDI by lead companies could be accompanied by 
suppliers moving in also (so-called “follow sourcing”); that fewer opportunities in 
domestic firms inhibited the movement of skilled workers from TNCs; and that the 
geographic clustering of TNCs into industrial parks limited scope for external cluster 
effects (IBID).vii 
                                                 
vii
 This will always happen in certain industries – such as the auto industry - as large first tier suppliers 
operate globally to carry out sub-assembly work for assemblers. A key challenge for developing 
economies is to have the capacity to supply these Tier 1 suppliers, and thus to develop and support 
firms further down the value chain, and in particular domestic small and medium sized firms. 
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Similarly to Ireland, Hungary actively used trade policy and subsidy packages in the 
1990s to attract FDI, with FDI-intensive industries being those where the degree of 
protection against imports was highest (EBRD, 1994).  This included the elimination 
of tariffs on inputs and increases in tariffs on final goods (such as TV assembly), and 
the introduction of discriminatory and product-specific import quotas such as in the 
paper industry (ibid).  Other industries where protection was offered included the 
cement industry (prior to a privatisation) and the car industry.  Tariffs on imports 
remained possible, even on those from the EU until 2002, under the vaguely worded 
Article 28 of the Europe Agreement. This allowed for ‘exceptional measures’ in infant 
industries, or sectors undergoing restructuring or facing serious difficulties. By 2002-
3, however, subsidy and trade protection packages became much more tightly 
regulated, with eventual EU entry in 2004 leading to the generous tax and excise 
concessions having to be abolished (FINK, 2006). Again, this is similar to the Irish 
experience, where estimates suggest that over the period 1980-2003, some €5.5 
billion was provided by the four Irish development agencies in the form of grant 
payments and equity investments (LENIHAN et al., 2005).  
As a result, a number of TNCs which had initially invested in Hungary opted to switch 
production to lower-cost neighbours (mirroring the phenomenon reported earlier for 
Ireland). These firms included high profile companies such as Phillips, IBM and 
Kenwood (ACS et al., 2007) with other TNCs also openly discussing the relative 
merits of whether to shift further east.  Decreases in FDI in the automotive, textiles 
and plastics sectors were to some extent countered by increases in FDI in media 
and food and tobacco (IBID.). There is some evidence to suggest that a loss of FDI 
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in such high-volume, price sensitive items has been compensated to a degree by a 
shift to higher value-added, lower-volume products that were formerly produced in 
EU-15 countries (PLANK and STARITZ, 2013) – for example, lower-value added 
items in Romania being used as inputs for production in Hungary (IBID.).   
As such, there has been a shift in inward FDI, from manufacturing to services over 
the 20 year period between 1990-2010, with only 30% inward FDI stock in held in 
manufacturing by 2010 (SASS and KALOTAY, 2012). Post-GFC data from 2011 
suggested that capital in transit accounted for over 83% of FDI inflows, indicating 
that “real” FDI inflows have struggled to recover (IBID). Similarly, The EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION (2015) notes concern on the ‘sluggishness’ of FDI in Hungary in 
recent years.  It notes that while annual net FDI flows in CEE countries declined 
post-GFC, the decrease in Hungary was somewhat more pronounced, with annual 
net FDI inflows on a generally decreasing trend since Hungary’s accession to the EU 
(IBID). It also notes a deteriorating attractiveness on greenfield investment and 
underlying FDI flows even recording negative figures recently (IBID). 
The lack of linkages between domestic suppliers and TNCs has compounded the 
situation in this regard, with FDI shifting away from Hungary in more recent years in 
favour of China and non-EU former Soviet bloc countries (BEKES, 2005). The 
Conservative (Fidesz) government of Viktor Orban, elected in 2010, has since 
displayed a variable stance to outside investors. Whilst it continued supporting FDI in 
some areas, such as the automotive and electronics sectors, it has taken a more 
restrictive stance in others – most notably in the service sectors of banking and 
telecommunications, where foreign affiliates were subject to high ‘windfall’ taxes 
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(SASS and KALOTAY, 2012). Most contentiously, Fidesz financed tax cuts by 
nationalising private pension funds in 2011 (INNES, 2012). This move, whilst 
improving the government’s underlying financial position, damaged its standing with 
international investors (IBID.). By 2015, Hungary was attracting US$2.5bn in FDI 
capital investment in 2015, a third the level seen in 2010, with the country labelled  
“the forgotten FDI destination” (FDI Intelligence, 2016). 
Hence, other CEE countries have improved their economic performance relative to 
Hungary. In this context it is notable that unemployment declined in every CEE 
country between EU entry in 2004 and 2008 - before the onset of the GFC - except 
for Hungary, where it had risen (see Figure 2, which also includes Ireland and the 
then EU-27 for comparison). This is not to suggest that entering the EU was solely 
responsible for this relative deterioration, as the unemployment rates of other CEE 
states were also reflective of a complex mix of internal and external pressures, 
including macroeconomic policy, convergence to Euro eligibility, policies to attract 
FDI and relative investment appeal. However, Figure 2 does highlight three distinct 
phases: Hungary’s comparatively better performance than other CEE states prior to 
EU entry in 2004; then Hungary’s eroding competitive advantage after EU entry 
relative to other CEE states between 2004 and 2008 (with a sharp rise in 
unemployment during 2004); and finally the impact of the 2008-09 GFC, as 
demonstrated by rising unemployment rates in all countries in the immediate 
aftermath of the GFC.viii  
                                                 
viii
 Most recently Hungary slipped in the 2016-17 World Economic Forum global competitiveness 
ranking from 63 to 69 (WEF, 2016).  
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FIGURE 2 AROUND HERE 
As in other CEE nations, a popular backlash against government intervention meant 
that the Hungarian government took a largely laissez-faire approach to industrial 
policy, with the exception of FDI policy, where it made active use of financial and 
other incentives in an attempt to attract FDI. Underpinning this was the assumption 
amongst policymakers and advisors that FDI had beneficial effects.  Reinforcing this, 
the prevailing economic orthodoxy, embedded in the Maastricht criteria, meant that 
FDI flows were warmly welcomed for their beneficial macro-stabilising effects (such 
as raising hard currency and budget revenues via the privatisation programme), but 
with little evaluation of their real effects on industrial development. The latter were 
modestly beneficial in Hungary in a number of areas, having a positive impact in a 
number of areas. These included investment and restructuring, trade reorientation, 
improving management know-how, the reshaping of intra- and inter- firm relations, 
accelerating the development of the private sector, and in some industries in 
facilitating technology transfer and increasing competition (see BAILEY, 1995).  
However, as seen above, the overwhelming desire of the government to attract FDI 
also meant that it failed to adequately address some of the potential dangers arising 
from such an over-reliance on FDI.  This is not a ‘failure’ of FDI, but rather a failure in 
policy to recognise potential problems and to address them.  
In this vein, DÖRRENBÄCHER (2007) critically examined the Hungarian model of a 
foreign-led modernisation strategy, one that offered the promise of industrial 
upgrading but which at the same time was likely to exacerbate social, regional and 
economic inequalities. The overall results of this strategy were quite mixed, he 
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suggests. By going for the ‘big capital’ solution (‘big foreign capital’ in the Hungarian 
case) so vigorously, the government neglected to promote domestic industrial 
development.   
On a more positive note, Török et al. (2013) argue that Hungarian industrial policy 
over time has become ‘relatively successful’ in introducing a number of tools for 
promoting innovation and supporting small and medium-sized enterprise as well as 
attracting FDI but  that a “marked industrial policy profile was missing most of the 
time” (IBID: 19).  They note that a “spectacular turn” towards active industrial policy 
occurred from 2000 under the Széchenyi Plan, with a much greater focus on 
innovation and network-building.  They also note that under the latest Hungarian 
innovation strategy, “specific well-targeted incentive schemes” are provided to 
support innovative SMEs (IBID). This would suggest at least a more rapid pace of 
policy learning and development than in the Irish case. However, the evidence to 
date suggests that the net impact of these policies on fostering indigenous capacity 
and innovation has been negligible (SZALAVETZ, 2013), with 74% of SMEs during 
2010 reporting “no innovation activity at all” (IBID. 45).  
 
Overall, there are lessons from this for other small CEE countries which have 
competed vigorously with each other to attract FDI. One interpretation of Hungarian 
experience suggests this was a misguided approach. Despite having received 
around a third of all FDI in CEE countries during the 1990s, the longer-run role of 
FDI in the Hungarian economic development has in fact been limited.  Competing 
with each other through offering incentives and trade protection to incoming 
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transnationals may not only be a negative-sum game for small CEE countries, but 
also overlooks the need to focus on the wider state of their economies and the 
development process, and in industrial policy terms on building domestic industrial 
capabilities (and hence adopting a more holistic approach to industrial development 
and policy and addressing patterns of uneven development).  The latter does at least 
appear to have been recognised to some extent via the most recent shifts in 
industrial policy, it could be argued (TÖRÖK et al., 2013). 
As such, returning to the issue of the evaluation of the real effects of industrial 
development, this is an issue where Ireland should most definitely not be held up as 
a ‘role model’.  Current approaches to industrial policy evaluation in Ireland are 
improving, but as outlined by LENIHAN et al. (2005), there was a lacuna of industrial 
policy evaluation existing until the 1990s, despite the fact that the first form of grant 
to industry was as far back as 1952.  According to ANDREOSSO-O’CALLAGHAN 
and LENIHAN (2006) - although not discussing the case of Hungary per se but the 
NMS in general – small CEE States can adopt a number of approaches in the 
context of industrial policy evaluation including: wait until pressure comes from the 
EC to evaluate (largely the stance adopted by Ireland until the 1990s); familiarisation  
with ‘best practice’ (or at least good practice) evaluative frameworks and 
methodologies adopted internationally so that the NMS will be well prepared when it 
‘requested’ to evaluate by the EC; or to view evaluation as a beneficial tool in its own 
right, that is, adopt a pro-active approach to industrial policy evaluation.  The latter 
approach is the one most favoured here, as evaluation can not only assist in 
ensuring accountability but can also help in improving policy over time.   
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CONCLUSION: LEARNING THE RIGHT POLICY ‘LESSONS’ FROM IRELAND 
AND HUNGARY?  
Whilst acknowledging the potential merits of FDI for economic development in both 
Ireland and Hungary, the limitations of FDI-led growth were increasingly, if belatedly, 
recognised. Ireland was extremely vulnerable to the US economic downturn, given 
its very large reliance on US-based FDI (and the construction sector). As such, 
during the GFC and ‘post-crisis’ period, Ireland has suffered from competition for FDI 
from emerging economies with lower wage and other costs, notwithstanding the 
positive contribution of FDI to job creation in Ireland post GFC. Similarly, Hungary, 
which enjoyed an initial advantage over its neighbours, also ‘lost out’ as it had to 
scale back the generous platform of assistance it provided to TNCs as part of its EU 
membership requirements.  In this context, the apparent failure to achieve any 
significant spillovers from the FDI sector to the indigenous sector in both countries 
(outside of the IT/software sector in the case of Ireland) only reiterates the need to 
facilitate domestic capacity and innovation.  
As such, a heavy reliance on FDI to drive industrial development and upgrading 
‘worked’ in a limited sense for a limited period of time in both Ireland and Hungary, 
but reached its limits when faced with changing TNCs’ strategies, new technologies, 
rising wages, adverse exchange rate movements, and the failure to achieve (in 
Hungary) or maintain (in Ireland) a social consensus over distributing the benefits of 
growth (see BAILEY et al., 2007).  Most recently, Ireland has been profoundly 
affected by the global financial crisis.  In both countries there has been something of 
shift towards focusing more on domestic SMEs, networks and clusters but we argue 
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these could have been focused on earlier as part of a more holistic industrial policy.  
It should always be acknowledged, that FDI is (and will continue to be) a key 
component of Ireland’s industrial policy strategy.  There is no doubting that TNCs 
play a key role in terms of their contribution to the Irish economy.  Looking at recent 
employment and turnover indicators for example, it is evident that TNCs employed 
257,000 persons and generated a turnover of €168.4 billion in 2010 (CSO, 2012: 7).  
To place this in context (and highlight the significance of this contribution), in 2010, 
total employment in the economy was over 1.2 million persons, while total turnover 
was €352 billion over the same period (IBID: 9). Additionally, research by WALSH 
(2010) has estimated that US companies have over many years paid approximately 
one third of the annual corporation tax revenue collected in Ireland.  Additionally, US 
companies make large payments of value added tax, excise duty and income tax.  In 
summary, therefore, foreign firms accounted for approximately 21 per cent and 46 
per cent of total employment and turnover respectively.  However, it should also be 
borne in mind as small CEE states look to the future that a reliance on FDI on its 
own is no guarantee of sustainable economic growth and development as the 
evidence provided in this paper clearly articulates.   
As LALL (2006) has noted with regard to the East Asian ‘tigers’, in the long run the 
route to  successful industrial development is through developing and diversifying 
local capabilities; whilst TNCs can help in this regard,  they will do so only  where it is 
profitable for them to do so. Indeed, it is up to governments to enable the provision of 
the quasi-public goods needed for the development and upgrading of domestic 
capabilities and collective learning (which we see as essential features in addressing 
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issues of uneven development, as noted above). Whilst this was recognised to a 
degree in both Ireland (belatedly) and Hungary,  a more holistic approach to 
industrial policy development at the outset – or at least at an earlier stage of 
development – might have helped in avoiding some of the problems we have 
identified above arising from FDI-led development and policy. 
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TABLE 1: GDP PER CAPITA IN PPS 
GDP PER CAPITA ~ INDEX 
EU 28 = 100 
     
 2002 
 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
 
EU 28 = 100 100 
 




33 34 36 37 40 
 
Czech Republic 74 
 
















45 48 51 55 60 












31 34 35 38 42 
Slovenia 82 83 86 86 86 87 















Figure 2: Unemployment rates (seasonally adjusted) 2000 – 2013 
 
Source: EUROSTAT (2010, 2010b, 2013) 
 42 
Sep 2013 figures actually Aug for Estonia, Jun for Latvia and Sep for Hungary. EU-27 now EU-28 for 
2013 figure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
